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Operational Resilience: A Strategic Framework for Malakoff
OR BB_v4_6

[OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [SuPS] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

This chapter presents a structured analysis of severe but plausible scenarios for each critical sub-process within CBF-1 Electricity Generation and Distribution Operations at Malakoff Corporation, a leading energy generation company in Malaysia.

With an increasingly complex operational environment shaped by energy transition pressures, digitisation, and climate volatility, Malakoff needs to anticipate and prepare for high-impact. These low-likelihood events could severely disrupt its core services.

Dr Goh Moh Heng
Operational Resilience Planner-Specialist-Expert
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Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-1: Electricity Generation and Distribution Operations

Introduction

[OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [SuPS] Identify Severe but Plausible ScenariosThis chapter presents a structured analysis of severe but plausible scenarios for each critical sub-process within CBF-1 Electricity Generation and Distribution Operations at Malakoff Corporation, a leading energy generation company in Malaysia.

With an increasingly complex operational environment shaped by energy transition pressures, digitisation, and climate volatility, Malakoff needs to anticipate and prepare for high-impact. These low-likelihood events could severely disrupt its core services.

Purpose of the Chapter

The chapter outlines scenario-specific threats, their integration with cyber and ICT risks, and documents proactive risk management actions currently in place to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

The purpose of this chapter is to enable senior management, risk officers, and operational leaders to understand the interdependencies between operational functions and digital infrastructure across Malakoff’s electricity generation and distribution value chain.

It provides a comprehensive framework for assessing potential resilience gaps, ensuring compliance with regulatory expectations on operational resilience, and supporting informed decision-making around business continuity planning and risk prioritisation.

Before proceeding with the chapter, readers should aim to appreciate how cyber-physical convergence introduces new threat vectors and how scenario testing serves as a foundational element for resilience maturity.

Sub-CBF Code

Sub-CBF

Severe but Plausible Scenario

Link to Cyber & ICT Risks

Evidence of Proactive Risk Management Action

1.1

Power Plant Operations (Thermal & Renewable)

Major turbine/ generator failure causing prolonged plant outage

Industrial control systems (ICS) breach via malware

Predictive maintenance systems and turbine integrity audits

1.2

Grid Connection & Load Dispatch Coordination

Grid instability due to transmission failure or uncoordinated load shedding

SCADA compromise resulting in false dispatch signals

Grid coordination drills and redundancy protocols with TNB

1.3

Energy Trading and Market Participation

Market manipulation leading to price volatility and losses

Breach of trading platforms or data manipulation

Secure trading platform with multi-factor authentication (MFA) and audit logs

1.4

Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Activities

Simultaneous failure of multiple critical assets during peak demand

IoT maintenance systems hijacked or disabled

Real-time O&M dashboards and anomaly detection using AI

1.5

Fuel Supply Chain Management

Fuel supply disruption due to geopolitical or logistical crisis

Hacked GPS/logistics tracking disrupting deliveries

Dual-source fuel contracts and real-time supply chain tracking

1.6

Water Intake, Treatment, and Cooling Systems

Heatwave reducing water availability, impairing cooling capacity

ICS disruption of automated water control valves

Water resource contingency planning and cyber-secured water treatment control

1.7

Environmental Monitoring and Compliance

Breach of emissions or discharge limits, causing regulatory action

Data spoofing of environmental sensors

Third-party environmental audits and tamper-proof monitoring systems

1.8

Remote Monitoring and SCADA Systems

Complete SCADA system lockout due to ransomware attack

Direct threat vector for cyberattacks on plant operations

Network segmentation, endpoint detection, and response systems (EDR)

1.9

Emergency and Black Start Capabilities

National grid collapse requiring an unscheduled black start

HMI (Human-Machine Interface) sabotage delays the restart

Periodic black start simulation and offline testing of backup systems

1.10

Health, Safety, and Emergency Response (HSE)

Major on-site accident involving hazardous materials

Disruption of emergency comms or incident tracking systems

Site-wide safety drills and digital twin models for emergency simulations

1.11

Regulatory Compliance and Licensing

Failure to comply with updated Grid Codes or Energy Commission mandates

Loss or manipulation of regulatory documentation

Legal compliance tracking software and digital archiving

1.12

Technical Asset Performance & Reliability Analytics

Data corruption leading to incorrect reliability predictions

Data integrity breach in analytics platforms

Use of blockchain for asset data integrity and cross-verification checks

1.13

Engineering and Technical Support Services

Inability to mobilise technical teams during a crisis

Cyber disruption of support ticketing or knowledge base

Cloud-based service continuity plans and backup comms platforms

1.14

Integrated Operations Control Centres (IOCC)

Simultaneous multi-plant cyberattack coordinated via compromised IOCC

Central command vulnerability due to ICT convergence

24/7 SOC (Security Operations Centre) integration with IOCC and network isolation protocols

Summing Up …

The scenarios outlined in this chapter offer a forward-looking perspective on how complex disruptions—whether technological, environmental, or cyber in nature—could impair Malakoff's ability to maintain continuous electricity generation and distribution.

By integrating cyber and ICT risks into operational planning and documenting mitigation efforts, the organisation not only complies with resilience standards but also builds organisational confidence and preparedness.

These efforts reinforce Malakoff’s commitment to ensuring the reliability, safety, and security of Malaysia’s critical energy infrastructure.

 

Case Study: Malakoff Corporation Berhad
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CBS-1 Electricity Generation and Distribution Operations
CBS CBS-1 DP CBS-1 MD CBS-1 MPR CBS-1 ITo CBS-1 SuPS CBS-1 ST
[OR] [MCB] [E3] [C2] [CBS] Requirement for Identifying CBS [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [DP] Electricity Generation and Distribution Operations [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [MD] Map Dependency [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [MPR] Map Processes and Resources [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [ITo] Establish Impact Tolerances [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [SuPS] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios [OR] [MCB] [E3] [CBS] [1] [ST] Perform Scenario Testing

 


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