CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services
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Within the Operational Resilience framework for the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), identifying Severe but Plausible Scenarios (SBPS) is critical to assessing the resilience of CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services.
These scenarios are designed to test how the organisation would respond to significant disruptions that are realistic, challenging, and capable of threatening the delivery of market data services to customers, exchanges, clearing houses, regulators, and financial market participants.
The objective is not to predict every possible event, but to identify credible disruptions that could expose vulnerabilities across people, processes, technology, facilities, and third-party dependencies.
For LSEG, market data services form a foundational component of global financial market infrastructure.
Any interruption, degradation, corruption, delay, or unauthorised manipulation of market data can have significant consequences for trading activities, price discovery, regulatory compliance, and customer confidence.
Therefore, severe but plausible scenarios must incorporate both operational and cyber-related threats, reflecting increasing interdependencies between ICT infrastructure, cloud services, telecommunications networks, cybersecurity controls, and data processing platforms.
The table below provides recommended severe but plausible scenarios for each detailed process within CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services, together with examples of proactive risk management evidence demonstrating preparedness and resilience.
Table P5: Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-2
|
Sub-CBS Code |
Sub-CBS Process |
Severe but Plausible Scenario |
Integration of Cyber and ICT Risks |
Evidence of Proactive Risk Management Action |
|
2.1 |
Market Data Source Acquisition and Feed Collection |
Simultaneous failure of multiple exchange feed connections during the peak trading period |
Network outage, DDoS attack, telecommunications failure |
Multiple feed providers, redundant circuits, periodic failover testing |
|
2.2 |
Market Data Validation and Quality Verification |
Corrupted incoming market data is accepted into the production environment |
Data integrity attack, software defect, malicious data injection |
Automated validation rules, anomaly detection, quality dashboards |
|
2.3 |
Market Data Normalisation and Data Transformation |
Transformation engine failure resulting in incorrect data formats being distributed |
Middleware failure, application corruption, cyber compromise |
Automated regression testing, secondary transformation platform |
|
2.4 |
Instrument and Reference Data Association |
The reference data repository becomes unavailable, causing incorrect instrument mapping |
Database outage, ransomware attack |
Reference data replication, integrity monitoring, backup restoration testing |
|
2.5 |
Real-Time Tick Data Processing |
High-volume market event overwhelms processing infrastructure, causing delayed ticks |
Capacity exhaustion, resource depletion attack |
Capacity stress testing, elastic scaling capability |
|
2.6 |
Market Data Aggregation and Consolidation |
Aggregation platform produces inconsistent consolidated market views |
Software defect, malicious code modification |
Data reconciliation controls, independent verification engines |
|
2.7 |
Data Enrichment and Analytics Processing |
The analytics platform generates incorrect derived data, affecting customers |
Algorithm compromise, processing failure |
Model validation, quality assurance reviews, dual-processing checks |
|
2.8 |
Entitlement and Subscriber Access Management |
Customers receive unauthorised market data due to an access control failure |
IAM compromise, privilege escalation attack |
Periodic entitlement reviews, MFA enforcement, segregation of duties |
|
2.9 |
Data Feed Publication and Distribution |
Distribution platform outage disrupts delivery to all subscribers |
Platform failure, DDoS attack |
Active-active architecture, geographic redundancy |
|
2.10 |
Low-Latency Data Delivery and Network Routing |
Core network routing failure introduces significant latency across markets |
Routing misconfiguration, network cyberattack |
Diverse network paths, latency monitoring, and route failover testing |
|
2.11 |
API Gateway and Connectivity Services |
The API gateway becomes unavailable, preventing customer access to market data |
API abuse, DDoS attack, gateway software failure |
API throttling, WAF deployment, gateway clustering |
|
2.12 |
Market Data Synchronisation and Time Management |
Time synchronisation failure creates inaccurate market timestamps |
NTP compromise, GPS signal disruption |
Multiple trusted time sources, timestamp validation controls |
|
2.13 |
Historical Data Capture and Archiving |
Historical market data becomes inaccessible following storage corruption |
Storage failure, ransomware attack |
Immutable backups, archival integrity testing |
|
2.14 |
Customer Delivery Channel Integration |
Third-party delivery channel experiences a prolonged outage, affecting customer access |
Vendor service disruption, API compromise |
Vendor resilience assessments, alternate delivery channels |
|
2.15 |
Exception Handling and Data Recovery Management |
Multiple concurrent data exceptions exceed operational recovery capacity |
Cyber incident, software malfunction |
Automated recovery workflows, recovery playbooks, and regular exercises |
|
2.16 |
Market Data Monitoring and Performance Surveillance |
The monitoring platform fails to detect deteriorating service performance |
Monitoring tool outage, attacker disabling alerts |
Independent monitoring systems, health checks, and alert testing |
|
2.17 |
Incident Response and Service Restoration |
Major cyberattack simultaneously affects primary and secondary environments |
Advanced persistent threat, ransomware |
Cyber response exercises, isolated recovery environments, and crisis simulations |
|
2.18 |
Regulatory Reporting and Data Compliance Monitoring |
Inability to provide the required market data reports to regulators within deadlines |
Data corruption, reporting system outage |
Regulatory reporting contingency procedures, compliance audits |
|
2.19 |
Cybersecurity Monitoring for Data Infrastructure |
Security monitoring platform fails during active attack campaign |
SIEM outage, security tooling compromise |
Security monitoring redundancy, threat hunting programme |
|
2.20 |
Business Continuity and Resilience Administration |
Regional disaster impacts the primary operations centre and recovery site simultaneously |
Natural disaster, widespread ICT infrastructure outage |
Multi-region recovery capability, resilience testing, and alternate operating locations |
Summary of Cross-Cutting Enterprise Severe but Plausible Scenarios
In addition to the process-specific scenarios above, LSEG should test several enterprise-wide scenarios that affect multiple components of CBS-2 simultaneously:
|
Enterprise Scenario |
Potential Impact |
|
Large-scale ransomware attack on market data infrastructure |
Data unavailability, corruption, and delayed distribution |
|
Cloud service provider regional outage |
Loss of processing, storage, analytics, and distribution services |
|
Telecommunications carrier failure |
Inability to acquire or distribute market data |
|
Insider threat manipulating market data feeds |
Data integrity compromise and regulatory exposure |
|
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on customer access channels |
Subscriber service degradation and latency increases |
|
Simultaneous cyberattack and market volatility event |
Extreme processing demand combined with infrastructure compromise |
|
Third-party exchange feed disruption |
Loss of source data and incomplete market coverage |
|
Regional natural disaster affecting operations centres |
Staff unavailability and infrastructure disruption |
The identification of Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services enables LSEG to understand how significant disruptions could affect its ability to deliver trusted, timely, accurate, and resilient market data services.
By considering scenarios spanning operational failures, cyber incidents, third-party disruptions, technology outages, and extreme market conditions, LSEG can assess whether existing controls, recovery strategies, and resilience capabilities remain sufficient to operate within established impact tolerances.
The integration of cyber and ICT risks into each scenario reflects the reality that modern market data services depend heavily on interconnected digital ecosystems.
Evidence of proactive risk management—such as resilience testing, cyber exercises, redundancy arrangements, monitoring controls, disaster recovery capabilities, supplier assurance programmes, and business continuity planning—demonstrates LSEG's commitment to maintaining operational resilience.
These severe but plausible scenarios should subsequently serve as the basis for scenario testing exercises to validate recovery capabilities, identify resilience gaps, strengthen operational readiness, and support the continuous improvement of LSEG's operational resilience programme.

Gain Competency: For organisations looking to accelerate their journey, BCM Institute’s training and certification programs, including the OR-5000 Operational Resilience Expert Implementer course, provide in-depth insights and practical toolkits for effectively embedding this model.
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