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Strengthening Resilience at London Stock Exchange Group: An Enterprise Approach
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[OR] [LSEG] [E3] [CBS] [2] [SbPS] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

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Within the Operational Resilience framework for the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), identifying Severe but Plausible Scenarios (SBPS) is critical to assessing the resilience of CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services.

These scenarios are designed to test how the organisation would respond to significant disruptions that are realistic, challenging, and capable of threatening the delivery of market data services to customers, exchanges, clearing houses, regulators, and financial market participants.

The objective is not to predict every possible event, but to identify credible disruptions that could expose vulnerabilities across people, processes, technology, facilities, and third-party dependencies.

For LSEG, market data services form a foundational component of global financial market infrastructure.

Any interruption, degradation, corruption, delay, or unauthorised manipulation of market data can have significant consequences for trading activities, price discovery, regulatory compliance, and customer confidence.

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Moh Heng Goh
Operational Resilience Certified Planner-Specialist-Expert

Strengthening Resilience at London Stock Exchange Group: An Enterprise Approach

New call-to-actionCBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services

[OR] [LSEG] [E3] [CBS] [2] [SbPS] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

Within the Operational Resilience framework for the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), identifying Severe but Plausible Scenarios (SBPS) is critical to assessing the resilience of CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services.

These scenarios are designed to test how the organisation would respond to significant disruptions that are realistic, challenging, and capable of threatening the delivery of market data services to customers, exchanges, clearing houses, regulators, and financial market participants.

The objective is not to predict every possible event, but to identify credible disruptions that could expose vulnerabilities across people, processes, technology, facilities, and third-party dependencies.

For LSEG, market data services form a foundational component of global financial market infrastructure.

Any interruption, degradation, corruption, delay, or unauthorised manipulation of market data can have significant consequences for trading activities, price discovery, regulatory compliance, and customer confidence.

Therefore, severe but plausible scenarios must incorporate both operational and cyber-related threats, reflecting increasing interdependencies between ICT infrastructure, cloud services, telecommunications networks, cybersecurity controls, and data processing platforms.

The table below provides recommended severe but plausible scenarios for each detailed process within CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services, together with examples of proactive risk management evidence demonstrating preparedness and resilience.

Banner [Table] [OR] [E3] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

Table P5: Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-2

Sub-CBS Code

Sub-CBS Process

Severe but Plausible Scenario

Integration of Cyber and ICT Risks

Evidence of Proactive Risk Management Action

2.1

Market Data Source Acquisition and Feed Collection

Simultaneous failure of multiple exchange feed connections during the peak trading period

Network outage, DDoS attack, telecommunications failure

Multiple feed providers, redundant circuits, periodic failover testing

2.2

Market Data Validation and Quality Verification

Corrupted incoming market data is accepted into the production environment

Data integrity attack, software defect, malicious data injection

Automated validation rules, anomaly detection, quality dashboards

2.3

Market Data Normalisation and Data Transformation

Transformation engine failure resulting in incorrect data formats being distributed

Middleware failure, application corruption, cyber compromise

Automated regression testing, secondary transformation platform

2.4

Instrument and Reference Data Association

The reference data repository becomes unavailable, causing incorrect instrument mapping

Database outage, ransomware attack

Reference data replication, integrity monitoring, backup restoration testing

2.5

Real-Time Tick Data Processing

High-volume market event overwhelms processing infrastructure, causing delayed ticks

Capacity exhaustion, resource depletion attack

Capacity stress testing, elastic scaling capability

2.6

Market Data Aggregation and Consolidation

Aggregation platform produces inconsistent consolidated market views

Software defect, malicious code modification

Data reconciliation controls, independent verification engines

2.7

Data Enrichment and Analytics Processing

The analytics platform generates incorrect derived data, affecting customers

Algorithm compromise, processing failure

Model validation, quality assurance reviews, dual-processing checks

2.8

Entitlement and Subscriber Access Management

Customers receive unauthorised market data due to an access control failure

IAM compromise, privilege escalation attack

Periodic entitlement reviews, MFA enforcement, segregation of duties

2.9

Data Feed Publication and Distribution

Distribution platform outage disrupts delivery to all subscribers

Platform failure, DDoS attack

Active-active architecture, geographic redundancy

2.10

Low-Latency Data Delivery and Network Routing

Core network routing failure introduces significant latency across markets

Routing misconfiguration, network cyberattack

Diverse network paths, latency monitoring, and route failover testing

2.11

API Gateway and Connectivity Services

The API gateway becomes unavailable, preventing customer access to market data

API abuse, DDoS attack, gateway software failure

API throttling, WAF deployment, gateway clustering

2.12

Market Data Synchronisation and Time Management

Time synchronisation failure creates inaccurate market timestamps

NTP compromise, GPS signal disruption

Multiple trusted time sources, timestamp validation controls

2.13

Historical Data Capture and Archiving

Historical market data becomes inaccessible following storage corruption

Storage failure, ransomware attack

Immutable backups, archival integrity testing

2.14

Customer Delivery Channel Integration

Third-party delivery channel experiences a prolonged outage, affecting customer access

Vendor service disruption, API compromise

Vendor resilience assessments, alternate delivery channels

2.15

Exception Handling and Data Recovery Management

Multiple concurrent data exceptions exceed operational recovery capacity

Cyber incident, software malfunction

Automated recovery workflows, recovery playbooks, and regular exercises

2.16

Market Data Monitoring and Performance Surveillance

The monitoring platform fails to detect deteriorating service performance

Monitoring tool outage, attacker disabling alerts

Independent monitoring systems, health checks, and alert testing

2.17

Incident Response and Service Restoration

Major cyberattack simultaneously affects primary and secondary environments

Advanced persistent threat, ransomware

Cyber response exercises, isolated recovery environments, and crisis simulations

2.18

Regulatory Reporting and Data Compliance Monitoring

Inability to provide the required market data reports to regulators within deadlines

Data corruption, reporting system outage

Regulatory reporting contingency procedures, compliance audits

2.19

Cybersecurity Monitoring for Data Infrastructure

Security monitoring platform fails during active attack campaign

SIEM outage, security tooling compromise

Security monitoring redundancy, threat hunting programme

2.20

Business Continuity and Resilience Administration

Regional disaster impacts the primary operations centre and recovery site simultaneously

Natural disaster, widespread ICT infrastructure outage

Multi-region recovery capability, resilience testing, and alternate operating locations

 

Summary of Cross-Cutting Enterprise Severe but Plausible Scenarios

In addition to the process-specific scenarios above, LSEG should test several enterprise-wide scenarios that affect multiple components of CBS-2 simultaneously:

 

Enterprise Scenario

Potential Impact

Large-scale ransomware attack on market data infrastructure

Data unavailability, corruption, and delayed distribution

Cloud service provider regional outage

Loss of processing, storage, analytics, and distribution services

Telecommunications carrier failure

Inability to acquire or distribute market data

Insider threat manipulating market data feeds

Data integrity compromise and regulatory exposure

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on customer access channels

Subscriber service degradation and latency increases

Simultaneous cyberattack and market volatility event

Extreme processing demand combined with infrastructure compromise

Third-party exchange feed disruption

Loss of source data and incomplete market coverage

Regional natural disaster affecting operations centres

Staff unavailability and infrastructure disruption

 

 

Banner [Summing] [OR] [E3] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

The identification of Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-2 Market Data Distribution Services enables LSEG to understand how significant disruptions could affect its ability to deliver trusted, timely, accurate, and resilient market data services.

By considering scenarios spanning operational failures, cyber incidents, third-party disruptions, technology outages, and extreme market conditions, LSEG can assess whether existing controls, recovery strategies, and resilience capabilities remain sufficient to operate within established impact tolerances.

The integration of cyber and ICT risks into each scenario reflects the reality that modern market data services depend heavily on interconnected digital ecosystems.

Evidence of proactive risk management—such as resilience testing, cyber exercises, redundancy arrangements, monitoring controls, disaster recovery capabilities, supplier assurance programmes, and business continuity planning—demonstrates LSEG's commitment to maintaining operational resilience.

These severe but plausible scenarios should subsequently serve as the basis for scenario testing exercises to validate recovery capabilities, identify resilience gaps, strengthen operational readiness, and support the continuous improvement of LSEG's operational resilience programme.

 

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