Introduction
Eastern General Hospital (EGH) will treat people at their most vulnerable, and many of its services cannot be paused. Risk assessment asks what could interrupt those services, how likely each event is, and how much harm it would cause. The answers decide where EGH spends effort and money, and they feed directly into the continuity strategies and plans developed in eBooks 2 and 3.
Chapter 8 introduced a seven-phase method, in which Risk Analysis
and Review is the second phase. This chapter explains how EGH can identify, analyse, evaluate and prioritise the risks of disruption to its prioritised activities and the resources they depend on. It follows clause 8.2.3 of ISO 22301:2019 and connects to the business impact analysis in clause 8.2.2, which Chapter 10 previews through the critical business functions. All ratings in this chapter are illustrative, because EGH is still being built and has no operating history from which to rate real risks.
Regulatory Expectations Shaping the Assessment
The Ministry of Health (MOH) regulates hospitals under the Healthcare Services Act 2020 (HCSA), which uses a risk-based licensing approach. Acute hospital service is a licensable service, with the Healthcare Services (General) Regulations 2021 and the Healthcare Services (Acute Hospital Service) Regulations 2023 setting service requirements and MOH issuing licence conditions. MOH Circular 87/2023 lists the licence conditions by title and does not itself set continuity rules, and the full conditions are published on MOH's HCSA resources page. EGH should read them in full and record any requirement that bears on disruption risk, such as emergency readiness [verify].
Singapore has no national BCM policy for hospitals, and EGH should not assume one. Where MOH rules do not formally set a business continuity standard for a given topic, EGH should treat ISO 22301 and good practice as a benchmark and say so in its risk documents. Other laws affect disruption risk in specific areas:
- Cybersecurity Act 2018: healthcare is a designated critical information infrastructure sector, and amendments passed in 2024 broaden incident reporting, including incidents in supply chains. EGH must confirm whether any of its systems fall under a designation [verify].
- Personal Data Protection Act 2012: sets duties for protecting patient data and for notifying breaches.
- Infectious Diseases Act 1976: sets notification and control duties during outbreaks [verify applicability].
- Workplace Safety and Health Act 2006 and fire safety legislation: set duties for safe premises and emergency evacuation [verify applicability].
Board and senior management oversight is the common thread. EGH's governing body should receive the risk register, challenge the ratings and approve the risk appetite. Outsourcing and third-party risk also matter, because a hospital depends heavily on suppliers and on shared SingHealth services.
Aligning with ISO 22301 and ISO 31000
Clause 8.2.3 requires a systematic process for identifying, analysing and evaluating the risks of disruption to the organisation's prioritised activities and their resources. It must lead to treatment decisions that inform the business continuity strategies in clause 8.3. The business impact analysis in clause 8.2.2 supplies the activities and the impact over time, and the risk assessment supplies the causes and likelihood.
It is important to separate this process from clause 6.1. Clause 6.1 asks the organisation to address risks and opportunities to the business continuity management system (BCMS) itself, such as a lack of management support, insufficient resources or a poorly understood scope. Clause 8.2.3 addresses risks of disruption to the hospital's services. A hospital might record both in one register, but they require different owners and different treatments.
ISO 31000:2018 provides a useful general framework for risk management, covering principles, process, risk criteria, treatment and monitoring. EGH can use its language and structure, and align the register with its enterprise risk management framework and SingHealth's expectations.
Methodology
Scope, criteria and risk appetite
The assessment begins by setting scope: which prioritised activities and resources are in view, and for which phase of the campus. EGH then sets risk criteria, which define how likelihood and impact are rated and what level of risk needs action. Risk appetite, set by the governing body, states how much risk EGH will accept. For patient safety, the appetite is normally very low, so a risk that threatens life-supporting services should be treated even if it is rare.
Identifying threats and vulnerabilities
Threats are events that could cause disruption. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that make an event more damaging. EGH should look at both in relation to five types of resource: people, premises, technology, information and suppliers or partners. For each prioritised activity, the question is what happens if each resource is lost.
The checklist later in this chapter helps with this step. Workshops should include clinicians, nurses, engineers, information technology staff, procurement and infection prevention, because each sees different weaknesses.
Analysing likelihood and impact
Analysis rates each risk on defined scales. The scales below are illustrative, and EGH should adapt them to its own context and appetite. The overall rating is likelihood multiplied by impact, giving a score from 1 to 25.
Table 9a: Illustrative likelihood scale
| Score | Level | Description over the planning horizon |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rare | Not expected to occur |
| 2 | Unlikely | Could occur once in many years |
| 3 | Possible | Could occur once in several years |
| 4 | Likely | Expected to occur at least once in a few years |
| 5 | Almost certain | Expected to occur every year |
Table 9b: Illustrative impact scale
| Score | Level | Patient safety | Service continuity | Regulatory and reputation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Minor | No harm | Brief delay in a non-critical service | No external interest |
| 2 | Moderate | Minor harm, no escalation of care | Several hours' disruption of a support service | Limited complaints |
| 3 | Significant | Harm needing extra care | Reduced capacity for a day in a major service | Internal review; some media interest |
| 4 | Major | Serious harm to several patients | Loss of a major service for several days | MOH inquiry; sustained media coverage |
| 5 | Severe | Death or widespread serious harm | Loss of emergency or critical care capacity | Licence action; loss of public trust |
Evaluating and treating risks
Evaluation compares each rating with the criteria and decides which risks need treatment. A typical banding is Low (1 to 4), Medium (5 to 9), High (10 to 16) and Critical (20 to 25). Treatment options are to avoid the risk by changing the activity, reduce it by lowering likelihood or impact, transfer it through contracts or insurance, or accept it with approval. Reducing and transferring risks lead to continuity strategies in clause 8.3.
From risk treatment to continuity strategy
Treatment decisions are the bridge to clause 8.3. When EGH chooses to reduce a risk, the way it does so becomes part of a continuity strategy. If the risk is a prolonged power failure, the treatment may be a larger fuel store, a tested transfer procedure and a rule that critical areas keep priority supply. If the risk is the loss of a key supplier, the treatment may be a second approved source and a minimum stock level. The BIA sets how fast each activity must recover, and the risk assessment shows which events are most likely to prevent that recovery.
The order matters. Teams that choose strategies before understanding risk and impact tend to buy solutions for the wrong problem. Teams that finish the analysis first can show their leaders why each expensive measure matters and which cheaper options were considered.
Single points of failure and dependencies
Some of the most serious weaknesses are single points of failure: one power feed, one network route, one supplier or one person with a scarce skill. Concentration risk arises when many activities rely on the same resource, such as a single electronic medical record. Dependencies on shared SingHealth services and on external providers must be mapped, with an owner for each.
Register, owners and review
A risk register records each risk, its rating, controls, treatment, owner and review date. Each risk needs a named owner with the authority to act. EGH should review the register at least annually, after every significant incident and at each phase of the campus opening.
Running workshops and interviews
Risk information comes from people. EGH should run structured workshops for each prioritised activity, with a facilitator, a scribe and a short agenda. A good workshop includes the activity owner, a frontline clinician, an engineer or information technology specialist who understands the dependencies, and someone from procurement or contracts. A risk or compliance representative helps keep ratings consistent across workshops.
Workshops should start with the activity and its resources, then ask what could stop each one, then rate the risks together. Interviews with individuals fill gaps, especially for scarce skills and for sensitive issues such as known weaknesses in a system. Notes should record the evidence behind each rating, because ratings without evidence tend to drift towards whatever the loudest participant believes.
Accepting, transferring and monitoring risk
Not every risk can be reduced to a low level. Some residual risk must be accepted, and acceptance should be a decision by someone with authority, recorded in the register and revisited. For patient-safety risks, acceptance should normally sit with senior clinical and executive leaders, and sometimes with the governing body. Transfer, through insurance or contractual terms, never removes the clinical consequence of a disruption, so EGH should not treat it as a substitute for resilience.
Monitoring turns the register into a living tool. Key risk indicators, such as the number of unpatched critical systems, supplier delivery performance or staff vacancy rates in critical areas, give early warning that a rating should change. Each indicator needs an owner and a threshold that triggers review.
Threat Landscape for EGH
A threat landscape should reflect the sector, operating model and country. The categories below are weighted for a Singapore acute hospital that is digitally enabled and opening in phases.
Cyber-attacks, ransomware and data breaches
This is among the highest-weighted threats. In 2018, attackers stole the non-medical personal data of about 1.5 million SingHealth patients, and the dispensed medication records of about 159,000 people, in an advanced and persistent attack. The Committee of Inquiry reported in January 2019 with 16 recommendations, finding that staff lacked adequate awareness and resources, that some incident responders missed chances to stop the theft and that system weaknesses could have been fixed beforehand. The Personal Data Protection Commission fined SingHealth and its IT provider. EGH, as a SingHealth hospital designed to be digital from the start, must take this lesson seriously.
Failure of core systems and critical equipment
A hospital depends on its electronic records, imaging systems, laboratory systems, medical device networks and building management systems. A global technology outage in July 2024 affected organisations worldwide, including healthcare providers, and showed how one faulty update can disable many systems at once [verify details]. EGH might map each clinical platform to a recovery approach and a manual fallback.
Suppliers, utilities and networks
A hospital needs continuous electricity, water, medical gases, cooling, telecommunications and a flow of medicines, sterile supplies, food and linen. EGH's virtual and home-based services also depend on telecommunications networks and on patients' home connections. The main construction contractor and building system vendors become critical during the handover period.
Natural hazards and climate
Singapore does not face earthquakes or typhoons, but it does experience intense rainfall, flash floods and rising temperatures. Amendment 1:2024 to ISO 22301 asks organisations to consider climate change. EGH might examine drainage, basement equipment, cooling capacity and the risk of heat stress for staff and patients, and it should test these assumptions during design.
Pandemics, civil unrest and transport outages
The COVID-19 pandemic showed Singapore's hospitals how quickly demand, staffing and infection control can change. SingHealth states that the EGH campus is designed so that spaces can be converted and areas closed off in an outbreak. Transport outages can stop staff reaching the site, and public disorder is rare in Singapore but should still be considered for security planning.
Loss of key personnel and scarce skills
A new hospital recruits many specialists simultaneously. Losing a few critical care nurses, theatre staff or engineers could limit a service. Succession, cross-training and secondments within SingHealth are the main treatments.
Regulatory, legal and reputational shocks
A serious patient-safety event, a data breach or a licence action could damage public trust quickly. Because EGH is new, reputation will be built in its first years, and one incident could shape perceptions for a long time.
Healthcare-specific and transition threats
A patient-safety event, such as a medication error or a failed infection control step, is both a clinical and a continuity threat. The transition from construction to operation is also a threat in its own right: new buildings, new teams and new systems all arrive together, and defects often appear at handover.
Linking threats to EGH's operating model
EGH's model has three features that change how a generic hospital threat list should be read. First, much of the care will be delivered outside the building, so telecommunications, home equipment and patients' own connections become part of the service. A fault in a mobile network could affect patients at home as quickly as it affects a ward. Second, the hospital will be digital from the start, so a smaller number of platforms will carry a larger share of activity. Third, EGH will be one part of a cluster, so a threat to a shared service elsewhere in SingHealth can become EGH's problem within minutes.
These features do not make the hospital more fragile. They mean that the usual controls, such as backup power and trained staff, need to be matched by controls for the digital and network layers. EGH might therefore ask each prioritised activity owner to name the three technology services they could not work without and to state the manual fallback for each.
Learning from precedents
Precedents are valuable because they show what actually went wrong. The SingHealth case is the closest example in Singapore. The inquiry found that no single failure explained the loss; a combination of weak awareness, missed chances to stop the theft and technical weaknesses allowed the attackers to succeed. For EGH, the lesson is that resilience depends on people and process as much as technology. Training, clear escalation paths and regular testing of detection and response are as important as the tools.
The COVID-19 pandemic offers a different lesson. It showed that capacity can change rapidly, that staff well-being affects availability, and that supply chains for protective equipment can be stressed. Hospitals that had flexible spaces and cross-trained staff adapted faster. SingHealth's description of EGH's convertible spaces suggests that these lessons have informed its design. EGH should add further Singapore and regional precedents to its register as it researches them, and should cite each source [verify].
Practical Tools
Threat-identification checklist
EGH can use this checklist in workshops for each prioritised activity.
- Which people are essential, and what happens if half are absent?
- Which rooms, floors or buildings are essential, and what if one is unusable?
- Which technology systems does the activity need, and what is the manual fallback?
- Which information is essential, and how is it backed up and restored?
- Which suppliers, utilities and partners does it rely on, and are there alternatives?
- Which cyber, fire, flood, outbreak or security events could affect it?
- Which regulatory or reputational events could follow a disruption?
- Where is the single point of failure?
Risk matrix
The matrix below shows where the illustrative risks in Table 9 fall. Each cell shows the risk references with that likelihood and impact. Ratings are illustrative.
Table 9c: Illustrative risk matrix (likelihood by impact)
| Likelihood \ Impact | 1 Minor | 2 Moderate | 3 Significant | 4 Major | 5 Severe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 Almost certain | |||||
| 4 Likely | R8 | R12 | |||
| 3 Possible | R5, R10 | R6, R9 | R1, R4 | ||
| 2 Unlikely | R7, R11 | R2, R3 | |||
| 1 Rare |
Worked example: infectious disease outbreak (R4)
The example below takes one risk end to end. It is a hypothetical for EGH and not a statement of fact.
- BIA context: inpatient ward care (CBF-2), critical care (CBF-4) and infection prevention and outbreak response (CBF-10) are prioritised activities that an outbreak would strain. Workforce deployment and staff welfare (CBF-14) is the key resource.
- Threat and vulnerability: a respiratory virus spreads in the community. Vulnerabilities include dense inpatient areas, staff who work across wards and limited isolation capacity.
- Inherent rating: likelihood 3 (possible) and impact 5 (severe) give a score of 15, which is High.
- Existing and planned controls: convertible spaces that SingHealth says the campus is designed to provide, an outbreak plan, staff cohorting rules, a stock of personal protective equipment and a surge staffing list.
- Treatment decision: reduce, by testing zoning, staffing and supply plans through an exercise, and transfer part of the exposure through agreements with other SingHealth institutions.
- Residual rating: likelihood 3 and impact 4 give 12, which remains High and needs executive visibility. If the exercise shows that zoning works, impact might fall further.
- Owner and review: the head of infection prevention, reviewed each quarter and after every exercise or alert.
Single points of failure and concentration at EGH
Beyond individual risks, EGH should look for patterns. Several risks in Table 9 point to the same weak spots: R1, R2 and R9 all depend on the clinical information platform, and R3, R5 and R7 all depend on building systems in the plant rooms. A single investment in tested recovery for the electronic medical record, or in protected plant space, therefore reduces more than one risk at once.
A dependency map is a practical way to show this. It lists each prioritised activity down one side and each resource across the top, and marks which resources the activity needs. Columns with many marks show concentration. EGH might find, for example, that most clinical activities rely on one network core, one identity service and one data centre, and then decide to protect those with the highest priority.
Presenting results to the risk committee or board
Boards need a short, clear view. A one-page summary should show the top risks, the movement since the last review, the controls and treatments in progress, and any decisions required. A heat map such as the matrix above helps, and each risk should be written as a scenario in plain language. The board should be asked to confirm risk appetite, approve major treatments and request independent assurance, for example through internal audit.
Summary Table
Table 9: Assessing Risks and Threats for Eastern General Hospital
The register extract below is illustrative. Ratings are shown as likelihood multiplied by impact. Prioritised activities are shown by critical business function code, as set out in Chapter 10.
| Ref | Threat category | Example scenario | Affected activities or resources | Current rating (L × I) | Existing or planned controls | Proposed treatment | ISO 22301 clause or regulatory link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Cyber-attack | Ransomware encrypts clinical systems and backups | CBF-12, CBF-1, CBF-3, CBF-5 | 3 × 5 = 15 (High) | Network segmentation; staff awareness; offline backups | Reduce: tested recovery, incident response drills | 8.2.3; Cybersecurity Act 2018 [verify]; PDPA 2012 |
| R2 | System failure | Electronic medical record unavailable for a day | CBF-12, CBF-2, CBF-6 | 2 × 5 = 10 (High) | Secondary data path; paper downtime forms | Reduce: downtime exercise, failover testing | 8.3; 8.5 |
| R3 | Utility failure | Prolonged power failure beyond backup run time | CBF-11, CBF-3, CBF-4 | 2 × 5 = 10 (High) | Backup generation; critical-area priority loads | Reduce: run-time tests; fuel contracts | 8.2.3; HCSA licence conditions [verify] |
| R4 | Pandemic or outbreak | Respiratory virus overwhelms isolation and staffing | CBF-2, CBF-4, CBF-10, CBF-14 | 3 × 5 = 15 (High) | Convertible spaces; outbreak plan | Reduce and transfer: surge exercise, cluster agreements | 8.2.3; Infectious Diseases Act 1976 [verify] |
| R5 | Natural hazard | Intense rainfall floods a plant room | CBF-11, CBF-5 | 3 × 3 = 9 (Medium) | Drainage design; flood sensors | Reduce: relocate critical plant, test pumps | 4.1 (Amendment 1:2024); 8.2.3 |
| R6 | Supplier failure | Key medicine or sterile supply delayed | CBF-6, CBF-9, CBF-3 | 3 × 4 = 12 (High) | Stock cover; secondary supplier | Reduce: minimum stock, contract terms | 8.3; HCSA licensee duties [verify] |
| R7 | Equipment failure | Medical gas or air conditioning failure in theatres | CBF-11, CBF-3, CBF-4 | 2 × 4 = 8 (Medium) | Redundant plant; alarms | Reduce: maintenance regime, manual fallbacks | 8.2.3; 8.3 |
| R8 | Loss of key personnel | Shortage of critical care and theatre staff | CBF-14, CBF-3, CBF-4 | 4 × 3 = 12 (High) | Recruitment pipeline; SingHealth secondments | Reduce: cross-training, succession plans | 7.2; 8.2.3 |
| R9 | Third-party failure | Shared platform or cloud provider outage | CBF-12, CBF-7 | 3 × 4 = 12 (High) | Service agreements; vendor reviews | Reduce and transfer: exit plans, recovery targets in contracts | 8.3; PDPA 2012 |
| R10 | Telecommunications outage | Network failure cuts links to home-monitored patients | CBF-7, CBF-13 | 3 × 3 = 9 (Medium) | Multiple carriers; phone fallback | Reduce: escalation protocol, home visits | 8.3; 8.4 |
| R11 | Reputational or regulatory shock | Serious patient-safety event or data breach | CBF-16, CBF-1 | 2 × 4 = 8 (Medium) | Clinical governance; communications plan | Reduce: crisis exercise, spokesperson training | 7.4; HCSA [verify] |
| R12 | Transition risk | Defects or untested processes at go-live of a campus phase | All CBFs in the phase | 4 × 4 = 16 (High) | Phased opening; Healthcare Living Laboratory trials | Reduce: readiness reviews, mock operations, rollback plans | 6.1; 8.1 |
All ratings, controls and scenarios are illustrative and must be validated by EGH.
Conclusion
Risk assessment gives EGH an evidence-based way to decide where continuity effort should go. The key points are to link ratings to patient safety, separate risks to services from risks to the BCMS, name owners for every treatment and review the register as the campus changes. The 2018 SingHealth attack shows that serious incidents can be avoidable when basic controls and awareness are in place.
EGH's immediate next steps are to confirm risk appetite with its governing body, adapt the scales to its own criteria, hold the first risk workshops for the earliest services and read the full HCSA licence conditions for continuity duties. The next chapter identifies the critical business functions that these risks threaten.
Sources
- Ministry of Health: Healthcare services regulation and licensing
- Ministry of Health: MOH Circular 87/2023, notice of issuance of licence conditions under the HCSA
- Cyber Security Agency of Singapore: Cybersecurity Act
- Society for Computers and Law: Singapore's worst cyber attack, the outcome of the investigation
- SingHealth: EGH Campus commences main construction (5 August 2025)
- SingHealth: EGH campus unveils Smart Hospital Roadmap (7 March 2026)
Continue reading: Chapter 10, Identifying Critical Business Functions for Eastern General Hospital, introduces the prioritised activities that EGH must protect and how to rank them.
Keeping Care Running: Managing and Implementing Business Continuity Management at Eastern General Hospital |
|||||
| eBook 1: Understanding Your Organisation | |||||
| C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
| C7 | C8 | C9 | C10 | C11 | C12 |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |





![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C1] Overview of BCM Case Study](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/4fadfc5a-aaef-4a8d-9e12-73a4962607a3.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C2] Understanding Your Organisation](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/91481e02-5830-45d2-9792-b5ac62d31648.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C3] Establishing Organisational Goals](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/2399832a-3fa8-4392-b904-dbac8a9394ce.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C4] Establishing Business Continuity Objectives](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/ff56e4d3-ce31-4bcb-b4dc-c2dad8dc1d66.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C5] Determining BC Assumptions](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/af5d7f28-5791-4e05-97c4-d1247b775a7f.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C6] Composing BCM Team](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/d161235c-fffb-4a81-bb52-bcb5062d58ac.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C7] Analysing Operating Environment](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/33fefd15-96cd-48e5-84c5-cc7612cf3246.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C8] Implementing the BCM Planning Methodology](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/9f97be88-5011-40d8-8391-83e0dced4dba.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C10] Identifying Critical Business Functions](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/cb4749ae-a696-4d2c-b505-28e05a8f4091.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C11] Summary](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/d050e49a-b47b-4b63-90d2-2b49d7ef1a23.png)
![[BCM] [EGH] [E1] [C12] Back Cover](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/8a1f3bea-63cc-48bd-81e4-a58d1f2347f9.png)





