eBook OR

[OR] [LSEG] [E3] [CBS] [1] [SbPS] Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios

Written by Moh Heng Goh | May 26, 2026 3:03:36 AM

CBS-1 Exchange Trading Services

For the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), identifying Severe but Plausible Scenarios (SbPS) for CBS-1 Exchange Trading Services is a key activity within Stage 4 of the Operational Resilience implementation methodology.

Severe but plausible scenarios are not routine operational incidents; they are extreme but credible events that could materially disrupt the delivery of critical business services.

In accordance with operational resilience principles described in the BCM Institute guidance, scenario identification enables organisations to assess vulnerabilities across people, processes, technology, facilities, data, and third-party dependencies.

For an exchange operator such as LSEG, where uninterrupted market operations are critical to market integrity and financial stability, these scenarios must evaluate the resilience of trading operations under highly disruptive conditions, including cyber incidents, infrastructure failures, market volatility events, and third-party disruptions.

The scenarios below are designed to support dependency mapping, impact tolerance validation, and future scenario testing activities.

Each scenario incorporates a cyber and ICT risk perspective and identifies evidence of proactive risk management actions demonstrating LSEG's preparedness and resilience capabilities.

Table P5: Identify Severe but Plausible Scenarios for CBS-1

Sub-CBS Code

Sub-CBS

Severe but Plausible Scenario

Impact/Effect

Proactive Risk Management Action

Link to Integration of Cyber and ICT Risks

1.1

Market Participant Onboarding and Membership Management

The identity and access management platform is unavailable during a major onboarding cycle

Delay in participant activation and inability for new members to access trading services

Automated onboarding workflows, alternate approval procedures, and resilience testing of IAM systems

Identity platform compromise, privileged account attack, directory service outage

1.2

Customer Identification and Regulatory Validation

External KYC/AML verification provider outage

Delayed regulatory validation and onboarding backlog

Secondary validation provider, manual fallback process, third-party resilience assessment

Third-party API disruption or cyber compromise

1.3

Trading Account Setup and Access Provisioning

Privileged access system corruption resulting from malware infection

Trading accounts cannot be created or modified

Segregated administration, privileged access management, and immutable backups

Cyber attack on identity and access infrastructure

1.4

Trading Platform Connectivity and Session Establishment

Network gateway failure at the primary exchange access point

Participants unable to establish sessions with the exchange

Diverse telecom providers, automatic failover, and network stress testing

DDoS attack against exchange connectivity gateways

1.5

Instrument and Product Configuration Management

Incorrect deployment of trading instrument parameters

Trading errors and market disruption

Change approval governance, release validation, and rollback procedures

Configuration manipulation through compromised admin access

1.6

Market Data Feed Distribution and Synchronization

Market data multicast infrastructure failure

Participants receive delayed or inconsistent market information

Dual feed architecture, latency monitoring, synchronization testing

Network intrusion affecting feed dissemination platforms

1.7

Order Entry and Capture Processing

Order gateway software failure during high-volume trading

Orders cannot be submitted or captured

Capacity testing, active-active processing, performance monitoring

Exploitation of trading APIs is causing service degradation

1.8

Pre-Trade Risk and Control Validation

Risk validation engine unavailable

Orders bypass controls or experience delays

Redundant risk engines and threshold monitoring

Malware affecting risk processing servers

1.9

Order Routing and Matching Engine Processing

Core matching engine failure during volatile market conditions

Trading interruption and inability to execute orders

Active-active architecture, high availability design, resilience exercises

Cyber compromise of the matching engine infrastructure

1.10

Trade Execution Processing

Database corruption affecting trade execution records

Trade failures and integrity concerns

Real-time replication and transaction recovery procedures

Ransomware attack affecting transaction systems

1.11

Trading Session and Market State Management

Session controller failure is causing incorrect market status

Market opens/closes incorrectly

Segregated controllers and operational validation procedures

Unauthorized access to altering session states

1.12

Market Surveillance and Trade Monitoring

Surveillance analytics platform unavailable during market abuse event

Delayed fraud detection and regulatory exposure

Alternate monitoring tools and incident escalation procedures

SIEM compromise or cyber attack on monitoring systems

1.13

Exception Handling and Trade Intervention Management

Manual intervention platform unavailable during trading incident

Delayed issue resolution and operational escalation

Backup intervention procedures and crisis playbooks

Administrative console cyber compromise

1.14

Circuit Breaker and Volatility Control Administration

Volatility control logic failure during flash market movement

Market instability and excessive price movement

Validation testing and simulated market exercises

Manipulation of control algorithms through cyber intrusion

1.15

Clearing and Settlement Integration Processing

Clearing the network interface is unavailable

Settlement delays and post-trade backlog

Secondary communication links and recovery procedures

API disruption from a cyber attack on external integration

1.16

Regulatory Reporting and Compliance Monitoring

Regulatory reporting application unavailable

Reporting breaches and potential sanctions

Alternative reporting procedures and resilience testing

Data exfiltration or attack on reporting systems

1.17

Reference Data and Master Data Administration

Corrupted master instrument data was introduced into production

Trade processing errors across multiple services

Data validation controls and dual approval process

Unauthorized modification of master data repositories

1.18

Cybersecurity Monitoring and Trading Infrastructure Protection

Security operations monitoring platform disabled during active intrusion

Threats remain undetected, and attacks escalate

SOC redundancy, SIEM failover, continuous monitoring

Advanced persistent threat targeting SOC infrastructure

1.19

Business Continuity and Exchange Recovery Operations

Regional data centre outage affecting the primary exchange site

Exchange service disruption and market outage

Alternate recovery site, crisis management exercises, recovery testing

Combined cyber-physical disruption and infrastructure attack

1.20

Trading Analytics and Operational Performance Reporting

Analytics platform unavailable during operational incident

Reduced visibility into exchange performance

Replicated reporting environments and operational dashboards

Data pipeline compromise affecting analytics integrity

 

The Severe but Plausible Scenarios identified for CBS-1 Exchange Trading Services provide LSEG with a structured basis for understanding how significant disruptions may affect the resilience of its exchange operations.

These scenarios extend beyond isolated technology failures and evaluate interconnected dependencies involving cyber threats, infrastructure disruptions, operational process failures, and third-party service interruptions.

By incorporating explicit links to cyber and ICT risks, LSEG can align operational resilience objectives with broader enterprise risk, technology resilience, and cybersecurity initiatives.

Furthermore, the inclusion of proactive risk management actions demonstrates evidence of preventive and detective controls rather than relying solely on recovery capabilities.

These scenarios should subsequently be used to design scenario testing exercises, validate impact tolerances, identify capability gaps, and drive continuous improvements to LSEG’s operational resilience framework.

Through regular review and testing, LSEG can strengthen confidence that Exchange Trading Services remain resilient under severe yet credible disruption conditions.

 

eBook 3: Starting Your OR Implementation
CBS-1 Exchange Trading Services
CBS-1 DP CBS-1 MD CBS-1 MPR CBS-1 ITo CBS-1 SbPS CBS-1 ST

Gain Competency: For organisations looking to accelerate their journey, BCM Institute’s training and certification programs, including the OR-5000 Operational Resilience Expert Implementer course, provide in-depth insights and practical toolkits for effectively embedding this model.

 

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