---
title: "[BCM] [SAESL] [E3] [CORE] [C5] Risk Impact and Likelihood Assessment for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited"
description: Impact, likelihood and risk ratings for SAESL's 31 threats, with expected disruption periods and a prioritised list to support ISO 22301 risk assessment.
---

.

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###### Building Resilient Operations: Implementing Business Continuity Management at SAESL

![\[BB\] \[SAESL\] \[18\] Crisis Response at the Jet Engine-2](https://blog.bcm-institute.org/hs-fs/hubfs/SAESL%20Graphic%20Folder/BB%20SAESL/%5BBB%5D%20%5BSAESL%5D%20%5B18%5D%20Crisis%20Response%20at%20the%20Jet%20Engine-2.png?width=1536&height=1024&name=%5BBB%5D%20%5BSAESL%5D%20%5B18%5D%20Crisis%20Response%20at%20the%20Jet%20Engine-2.png "[BB] [SAESL] [18] Crisis Response at the Jet Engine-2")

# \[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[CORE\] \[C5\] Risk Impact and Likelihood Assessment for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited

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Chapter 3 built the Threat Register, and Chapter 4 recorded the treatments and controls. This chapter builds on both for the risk assessment in ISO 22301, clause 8.2.3. It scores the 31 specific threats against the 25 critical business functions (CBFs) and prepares the mitigation strategies in Chapter 6.

**Assessment basis.** Scores represent **current risk after the existing controls in Chapter 4, before any additional planned controls**. Because those controls are assumed and not confirmed, every score is an indicative assumption. Risk owners and senior management must validate each score before SAESL relies on it. The table does not mix inherent risk, current risk and future residual risk.

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[Moh Heng Goh](https://blog.bcm-institute.org/bcm-v2/author/moh-heng-goh) Nov 16, 2026

## Introduction

A list of threats and controls does not show where Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited (SAESL) should act first. This chapter scores every threat for impact and likelihood, calculates a risk rating and estimates how long a credible scenario could disrupt operations. The result is a ranked view that management can use.

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Chapter 3 built the Threat Register, and Chapter 4 recorded the treatments and controls. This chapter builds on both for the risk assessment in ISO 22301, clause 8.2.3. It scores the 31 specific threats against the 25 critical business functions (CBFs) and prepares the mitigation strategies in Chapter 6.

**Assessment basis.** Scores represent **current risk after the existing controls in Chapter 4, before any additional planned controls**. Because those controls are assumed and not confirmed, every score is an indicative assumption. Risk owners and senior management must validate each score before SAESL relies on it. The table does not mix inherent risk, current risk and future residual risk.

## Why impact and likelihood are scored together

Impact measures how severe the consequences could be. Likelihood measures how probable the threat is. The two are assessed independently, because a severe event can be rare and a frequent event can be minor. Combining them gives a rating that supports management priorities and resource allocation.

Impact is scored across seven areas, because a single event can hurt several parts of the business at once. The highest credible score is used in the calculation so that a severe consequence in any one area is never averaged away. The numbers support professional judgement and do not replace it. They should be read alongside control effectiveness and SAESL's risk appetite.

## Scoring method

Impact and likelihood use five-point scales. Table RAR P3-S summarises them. For SAESL, the Social Responsibility area covers aviation safety and airworthiness assurance, environmental harm and community effects.

**Table RAR P3-S: Scoring Scales for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Score** | **Impact (all seven areas)** | **Likelihood** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | **Very Low (Insignificant): minimal consequence, managed by routine operations** | **Very Low (Rare): exceptional; not expected under normal circumstances** |
| **2** | **Low (Minor): limited and manageable consequences** | **Low (Unlikely): could occur but not expected under normal conditions** |
| **3** | **Moderate: material but manageable; needs coordinated management attention** | **Moderate (Possible): realistic possibility; occurs periodically** |
| **4** | **High (Major): significant effect on critical services, obligations or interested parties** | **High (Likely): expected in many circumstances** |
| **5** | **Very High (Severe): threatens essential operations or the ability to meet obligations** | **Very High (Almost Certain): expected frequently or already occurring** |

In the impact areas, IT means information technology. The impact areas are Finance, Operations, Legal and Regulatory, Reputation and Image, Social Responsibility, People, and Assets, IT Systems and Information. The risk rating equals the highest impact score multiplied by the likelihood score. The default risk-level bands, used because no approved SAESL risk matrix was supplied, are:

- **1–4:** Very Low / Low
- **5–9:** Moderate
- **10–16:** High
- **17–25:** Very High (Extreme)

The expected period of disruption is a credible-scenario estimate after existing controls. It is not the recovery time objective (RTO), which is a target, and not the maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD), which is a limit. Chapter 1 explains the difference.

## Impact assessment

Table RAR P3 gives the impact score for each area and shows the highest score. Where several areas share the highest score, all are named. A score of 1 is shown as Insignificant and no area is left blank.

**Table RAR P3: Risk Impact and Likelihood Assessment for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Threat** | **Impact Area – Finance** | **Impact Area – Operations** | **Impact Area – Legal and Regulatory** | **Impact Area – Reputation and Image** | **Impact Area – Social Responsibility** | **Impact Area – People** | **Impact Area – Assets, IT Systems and Information** | **Risk Impact Area – Highest Numeric Score** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Flash Flood (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **3** | **3 – Finance; Operations; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Severe Storm (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **2** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **2** | **2 – Finance; Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Lightning Strike (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **2** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **2** | **2 – Finance; Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Extreme Heat (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **2** | **2 – Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Haze (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **2** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **2** | **2** | **2 – Finance; Operations; Social Responsibility; People; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **4** | **4** | **2** | **2** | **2** | **4** | **2** | **4 – Finance; Operations; People** |
| **Fire (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **4** | **5** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **4** | **4** | **5 – Operations** |
| **Explosion (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **4** | **5** | **4** | **4** | **3** | **5** | **4** | **5 – Operations; People** |
| **Chemical Spill (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **3 – Operations; Legal and Regulatory; Reputation and Image; Social Responsibility; People** |
| **Bomb Threat (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **3 – Operations** |
| **Terrorism (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **4** | **4** | **3** | **4** | **4** | **5** | **4** | **5 – People** |
| **Road Closure (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2 – Operations** |
| **Pandemic (Unavailability of People)** | **4** | **4** | **2** | **2** | **2** | **4** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4 – Finance; Operations; People** |
| **Industrial Action (Unavailability of People)** | **3** | **4** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4 – Operations** |
| **Loss of Key Personnel (Unavailability of People)** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **3 – Finance; Operations; Legal and Regulatory; People** |
| **Skills Shortage (Unavailability of People)** | **3** | **4** | **2** | **2** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4 – Operations** |
| **Industrial Accident (Unavailability of People)** | **3** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **3** | **5** | **2** | **5 – People** |
| **Staff Fatigue (Unavailability of People)** | **3** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4 – Legal and Regulatory; Social Responsibility** |
| **Supplier Failure (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3** | **4** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **4 – Operations** |
| **Single Source Dependency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **4** | **4** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **4 – Finance; Operations** |
| **Logistics Disruption (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **3 – Finance; Operations** |
| **Import Restrictions (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3** | **4** | **4** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **4 – Operations; Legal and Regulatory** |
| **Third-Party Cyber Incident (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **4** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4** | **4 – Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Vendor Insolvency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **3 – Finance; Operations** |
| **Ransomware (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **4** | **5** | **4** | **5** | **2** | **2** | **5** | **5 – Operations; Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Data Breach (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **4** | **2** | **5** | **5** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4** | **5 – Legal and Regulatory; Reputation and Image** |
| **Network Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **3** | **3 – Operations; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Telecommunications Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **2** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **3 – Operations** |
| **Power Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3** | **4** | **1 – Insignificant** | **2** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **4 – Operations** |
| **Application Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **1 – Insignificant** | **4** | **4 – Operations; Assets, IT and Information** |
| **Data Centre Outage (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **3** | **1 – Insignificant** | **1 – Insignificant** | **5** | **5 – Assets, IT and Information** |

## Likelihood, rating and expected disruption

Table RAR P3B gives the likelihood, the calculated risk rating, the risk level, and the expected period of disruption, with the main factor influencing duration.

**Table RAR P3B: Risk Impact and Likelihood Assessment for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Threat** | **Risk Likelihood** | **Risk Rating** | **Risk Level** | **Expected Period of Disruption** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Flash Flood (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **3 × 2 = 6** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours, depending on main access road clearance** |
| **Severe Storm (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **4 – Likely** | **2 × 4 = 8** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours, depending on storm duration and site clean-up** |
| **Lightning Strike (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **4 – Likely** | **2 × 4 = 8** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours, depending on warning duration and equipment damage** |
| **Extreme Heat (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **4 – Likely** | **2 × 4 = 8** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours, depending on cooling capacity and shift scheduling** |
| **Haze (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **3 – Possible** | **2 × 3 = 6** | **Moderate** | **1–3 days, depending on air-quality trend and filter capacity** |
| **Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **4 × 2 = 8** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks, depending on restriction type and duration** |
| **Fire (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **5 × 2 = 10** | **High** | **2–4 weeks, depending on area affected and fire-compartment integrity** |
| **Explosion (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **1 – Rare** | **5 × 1 = 5** | **Moderate** | **More than 1 month, depending on structural damage and investigation** |
| **Chemical Spill (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **3 – Possible** | **3 × 3 = 9** | **Moderate** | **1–3 days, depending on spill size and clean-up time** |
| **Bomb Threat (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **3 × 2 = 6** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours, depending on search time and police direction** |
| **Terrorism (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **1 – Rare** | **5 × 1 = 5** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks, depending on police cordon and site damage** |
| **Road Closure (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **3 – Possible** | **2 × 3 = 6** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours, depending on closure length and detour availability** |
| **Pandemic (Unavailability of People)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **4 × 2 = 8** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks, depending on absence rate and restriction duration** |
| **Industrial Action (Unavailability of People)** | **1 – Rare** | **4 × 1 = 4** | **Very Low / Low** | **1–2 weeks, depending on dispute scope** |
| **Loss of Key Personnel (Unavailability of People)** | **3 – Possible** | **3 × 3 = 9** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks, depending on time to authorise replacements** |
| **Skills Shortage (Unavailability of People)** | **4 – Likely** | **4 × 4 = 16** | **High** | **More than 1 month, depending on recruitment pipeline and training lead time** |
| **Industrial Accident (Unavailability of People)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **5 × 2 = 10** | **High** | **1–3 days, depending on investigation scope** |
| **Staff Fatigue (Unavailability of People)** | **3 – Possible** | **4 × 3 = 12** | **High** | **1–3 days, depending on detection of errors before release** |
| **Supplier Failure (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **4 – Likely** | **4 × 4 = 16** | **High** | **2–4 weeks, depending on alternate sources and stock cover** |
| **Single Source Dependency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3 – Possible** | **4 × 3 = 12** | **High** | **More than 1 month, depending on time to qualify an alternate source** |
| **Logistics Disruption (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3 – Possible** | **3 × 3 = 9** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks, depending on route and carrier alternatives** |
| **Import Restrictions (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **4 × 2 = 8** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks, depending on restriction scope** |
| **Third-Party Cyber Incident (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **3 – Possible** | **4 × 3 = 12** | **High** | **1–3 days, depending on isolation of the connection** |
| **Vendor Insolvency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **3 × 2 = 6** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks, depending on parts held at vendor and replacement lead time** |
| **Ransomware (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3 – Possible** | **5 × 3 = 15** | **High** | **1–2 weeks, depending on restoration of clean backups** |
| **Data Breach (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3 – Possible** | **5 × 3 = 15** | **High** | **3–7 days, depending on scope of investigation** |
| **Network Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3 – Possible** | **3 × 3 = 9** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours, depending on redundant paths and spares** |
| **Telecommunications Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **3 × 2 = 6** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours, depending on carrier restoration** |
| **Power Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **4 × 2 = 8** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours, depending on backup power capacity** |
| **Application Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **3 – Possible** | **4 × 3 = 12** | **High** | **1–3 days, depending on vendor fix and restore time** |
| **Data Centre Outage (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **2 – Unlikely** | **5 × 2 = 10** | **High** | **1–3 days, depending on failover readiness** |

Under these assumptions, 11 threats are rated High, 19 Moderate and 1 Very Low / Low. No threat reaches Very High (Extreme). That outcome depends on the assumed controls and should not be read as a statement that SAESL faces no severe exposure.

## High and Extreme Risk Analysis

The 11 threats rated High need prioritised management action. The table summarises each one without repeating the full assessment. No threat is rated Extreme. Attention levels follow the rating: executive sponsorship where the rating is 15 or more, and functional-head oversight otherwise.

**Table RAR P3-H: High Risk Analysis for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Threat** | **Highest Impact Area** | **Main Consequences** | **Likelihood Driver** | **Expected Disruption Period** | **Most Significant Existing Control** | **Principal Control Weakness** | **Management Attention Required** | **Urgent Mitigation?** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Skills Shortage** | **Operations** | **Capacity cap, longer turnaround** | **Sustained talent competition** | **More than 1 month** | **Training and competency programmes (preventive, assumed)** | **Capacity-versus-skills forecast not evidenced** | **Executive sponsor; monthly progress review** | **Yes** |
| **Supplier Failure** | **Operations** | **Engines waiting for parts, delayed deliveries** | **Global supply constraints** | **2–4 weeks** | **Safety stock of high-use parts (compensating, assumed)** | **Critical-part stock cover not evidenced** | **Executive sponsor; monthly progress review** | **Yes** |
| **Ransomware** | **Operations; Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** | **Loss of systems, records and customer trust** | **Worldwide targeting of industrial firms** | **1–2 weeks** | **Endpoint protection and email filtering (preventive, assumed)** | **Offline backup and restore testing not evidenced** | **Executive sponsor; monthly progress review** | **Yes** |
| **Data Breach** | **Legal and Regulatory; Reputation and Image** | **Notification duties, loss of trust, investigation** | **Persistent attack and error exposure** | **3–7 days** | **Access control and encryption (preventive, assumed)** | **Data classification and access reviews not evidenced** | **Executive sponsor; monthly progress review** | **Yes** |
| **Staff Fatigue** | **Legal and Regulatory; Social Responsibility** | **Quality escapes, rework, safety risk** | **Peak workload and overtime** | **1–3 days** | **Rostering limits (preventive, assumed)** | **Fatigue-risk monitoring not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **No – within planned timeframe** |
| **Single Source Dependency** | **Finance; Operations** | **Work halted until an alternate is qualified** | **Approval constraints on sources** | **More than 1 month** | **Long-term agreements (compensating, assumed)** | **Dependency map not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **No – within planned timeframe** |
| **Third-Party Cyber Incident** | **Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** | **Link isolation, data exposure, customer concern** | **Rising supply-chain attacks** | **1–3 days** | **Network segmentation (preventive, assumed)** | **Third-party security assurance not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **No – within planned timeframe** |
| **Application Failure** | **Operations; Assets, IT and Information** | **Blocked work orders, delayed release** | **Software defects and change errors** | **1–3 days** | **Change management (preventive, assumed)** | **Manual workarounds not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **No – within planned timeframe** |
| **Fire** | **Operations** | **Damage to engines and tooling, injury, extended area closure** | **Flammable materials in work areas** | **2–4 weeks** | **Fire detection and suppression (detective and corrective, assumed)** | **Fire-compartment and suppression testing records not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **Yes** |
| **Industrial Accident** | **People** | **Injury or death, work stoppage, regulatory investigation** | **Heavy engines and machinery in daily use** | **1–3 days** | **Safety Management System procedures (directive, assumed)** | **Near-miss trend analysis not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **Yes** |
| **Data Centre Outage** | **Assets, IT and Information** | **Loss of all hosted systems** | **Infrequent infrastructure faults** | **1–3 days** | **Disaster recovery site or replication (recovery, assumed)** | **Disaster recovery test not evidenced** | **Functional head; quarterly review** | **Yes** |

## Analysis by Impact Area

The table below counts how many threats score 4 or 5 in each area. Together with the named threats, it shows where SAESL should concentrate cross-functional resilience investment.

**Table RAR P3-A: Impact Area Concentration for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Impact Area** | **Threats Scoring 4 or 5** | **Leading Threats** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Finance** | **8** | **Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions, Fire, Explosion, Terrorism and Pandemic** |
| **Operations** | **14** | **Fire, Explosion, Ransomware, Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions and Terrorism** |
| **Legal and Regulatory** | **6** | **Data Breach, Explosion, Industrial Accident, Staff Fatigue and Import Restrictions** |
| **Reputation and Image** | **5** | **Ransomware, Data Breach, Explosion, Terrorism and Third-Party Cyber Incident** |
| **Social Responsibility** | **2** | **Terrorism and Staff Fatigue** |
| **People** | **6** | **Explosion, Terrorism, Industrial Accident, Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions and Fire** |
| **Assets, IT Systems and Information** | **8** | **Ransomware, Data Centre Outage, Fire, Explosion and Terrorism** |

Operations has the greatest concentration of high scores (14 threats scoring 4 or 5 in Operations), consistent with an organisation whose value lies in engine throughput. Several threats affect more than one area at once. Fire, Explosion, Chemical Spill, Terrorism, Industrial Accident, Staff Fatigue, Third-Party Cyber Incident, Ransomware, Application Failure and Data Centre Outage each score 3 or more in at least five of the seven areas.

Several themes recur. Dependence on IT systems and supplier parts amplifies many consequences, because one failed dependency can stop several CBFs. Some impacts arrive late: legal and regulatory consequences of a data breach, or customer penalties after a long supply delay, can follow the event by weeks. Some continue after operations resume: reputation and customer confidence recover more slowly than systems. Recognising these patterns lets SAESL invest once in controls that help several functions, such as tested recovery of records and systems.

## Likelihood and Expected Disruption Analysis

- **Highest likelihood:** Severe Storm, Lightning Strike, Extreme Heat, Skills Shortage, and Supplier Failure are rated Likely, mostly due to recurring weather, workforce, and supply conditions.
- **Low likelihood, severe consequence:** Fire, Explosion, Terrorism, Industrial Accident and Data Centre Outage. An impact score of 5 should still trigger planning because of the potential for loss of life or capability.
- **Short, intense disruption:** Flash Flood, Severe Storm, Lightning Strike, Extreme Heat, Bomb Threat, Road Closure, Network Failure, Telecommunications Failure and Power Failure.
- **Prolonged disruption:** Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions, Fire, Explosion, Terrorism, Pandemic, Industrial Action, Loss of Key Personnel, Skills Shortage, Supplier Failure, Single Source Dependency, Logistics Disruption, Import Restrictions, Vendor Insolvency and Ransomware.
- **Dependent on external parties:** Supplier Failure, Single Source Dependency, Logistics Disruption, Import Restrictions, Third-Party Cyber Incident, Vendor Insolvency, Power Failure and Telecommunications Failure. Their duration depends on suppliers, carriers, utilities or authorities.
- **Expected period may exceed current recovery capability:** Ransomware (1–2 weeks against an indicative IT Services MTPD of 48 hours (CBF-11)); Data Breach (3–7 days against an indicative Cybersecurity Operations MTPD of 24 hours (CBF-13)); Data Centre Outage (1–3 days against an indicative IT Services MTPD of 48 hours (CBF-11)). These comparisons use the indicative values in Chapter 1.
- **Needing improved early warning:** Flash Flood, Severe Storm, Lightning Strike, Haze, Extreme Heat, Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions, Industrial Action and Skills Shortage.
- **Needing scenario-specific plans:** Fire, Explosion, Terrorism, Ransomware, Data Centre Outage and Pandemic.

A threat with moderate likelihood can still demand urgent attention. If the impact is severe or the disruption lasts longer than the MTPD of the affected functions, even an occasional event produces unacceptable harm. Single Source Dependency is an example: moderate likelihood, but a replacement source can take months to qualify.

## Risk Prioritisation

Table RAR P3A ranks all 31 threats by risk level, rating, severity of legal, safety, or social consequences, expected disruption period, uncertainty, control weakness, and dependency concentration. Within each level, the ranking follows the rating. One adjustment applies: threats rated 5 for impact that involve people or safety are placed above other threats in the Moderate band, because a lower rating should not hide a potential fatality.

**Table RAR P3A: Risk Prioritisation for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited**

| **Priority Rank** | **Threat** | **Highest Impact Area** | **Likelihood** | **Risk Rating** | **Risk Level** | **Expected Disruption Period** | **Recommended Management Response** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | **Skills Shortage (Unavailability of People)** | **Operations** | **4 – Likely** | **16** | **High** | **More than 1 month** | **Detailed Business Continuity Strategy** |
| **2** | **Supplier Failure (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Operations** | **4 – Likely** | **16** | **High** | **2–4 weeks** | **Supplier continuity assurance** |
| **3** | **Data Breach (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Legal and Regulatory; Reputation and Image** | **3 – Possible** | **15** | **High** | **3–7 days** | **Immediate mitigation** |
| **4** | **Ransomware (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Operations; Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** | **3 – Possible** | **15** | **High** | **1–2 weeks** | **Immediate mitigation; Crisis Management scenario development** |
| **5** | **Single Source Dependency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Finance; Operations** | **3 – Possible** | **12** | **High** | **More than 1 month** | **Supplier continuity assurance** |
| **6** | **Staff Fatigue (Unavailability of People)** | **Legal and Regulatory; Social Responsibility** | **3 – Possible** | **12** | **High** | **1–3 days** | **Immediate mitigation** |
| **7** | **Third-Party Cyber Incident (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Reputation and Image; Assets, IT and Information** | **3 – Possible** | **12** | **High** | **1–3 days** | **Supplier continuity assurance** |
| **8** | **Application Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Operations; Assets, IT and Information** | **3 – Possible** | **12** | **High** | **1–3 days** | **IT Disaster Recovery enhancement** |
| **9** | **Industrial Accident (Unavailability of People)** | **People** | **2 – Unlikely** | **10** | **High** | **1–3 days** | **Immediate mitigation** |
| **10** | **Fire (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **Operations** | **2 – Unlikely** | **10** | **High** | **2–4 weeks** | **Detailed Business Continuity Strategy** |
| **11** | **Data Centre Outage (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Assets, IT and Information** | **2 – Unlikely** | **10** | **High** | **1–3 days** | **IT Disaster Recovery enhancement** |
| **12** | **Explosion (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **Operations; People** | **1 – Rare** | **5** | **Moderate** | **More than 1 month** | **Crisis Management scenario development** |
| **13** | **Terrorism (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **People** | **1 – Rare** | **5** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks** | **Crisis Management scenario development** |
| **14** | **Loss of Key Personnel (Unavailability of People)** | **Finance; Operations; Legal and Regulatory; People** | **3 – Possible** | **9** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks** | **Detailed Business Continuity Strategy** |
| **15** | **Logistics Disruption (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Finance; Operations** | **3 – Possible** | **9** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks** | **Supplier continuity assurance** |
| **16** | **Chemical Spill (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **Operations; Legal and Regulatory; Reputation and Image; Social Responsibility; People** | **3 – Possible** | **9** | **Moderate** | **1–3 days** | **Further assessment** |
| **17** | **Network Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Operations; Assets, IT and Information** | **3 – Possible** | **9** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours** | **IT Disaster Recovery enhancement** |
| **18** | **Pandemic-Related Movement Restrictions (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Finance; Operations; People** | **2 – Unlikely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks** | **Detailed Business Continuity Strategy** |
| **19** | **Pandemic (Unavailability of People)** | **Finance; Operations; People** | **2 – Unlikely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks** | **Detailed Business Continuity Strategy** |
| **20** | **Import Restrictions (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Operations; Legal and Regulatory** | **2 – Unlikely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **1–2 weeks** | **Further assessment** |
| **21** | **Severe Storm (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Finance; Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** | **4 – Likely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **22** | **Power Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Operations** | **2 – Unlikely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours** | **IT Disaster Recovery enhancement** |
| **23** | **Lightning Strike (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Finance; Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** | **4 – Likely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **24** | **Extreme Heat (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Operations; People; Assets, IT and Information** | **4 – Likely** | **8** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **25** | **Vendor Insolvency (Disruption to the Supply Chain)** | **Finance; Operations** | **2 – Unlikely** | **6** | **Moderate** | **2–4 weeks** | **Supplier continuity assurance** |
| **26** | **Haze (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Finance; Operations; Social Responsibility; People; Assets, IT and Information** | **3 – Possible** | **6** | **Moderate** | **1–3 days** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **27** | **Flash Flood (Denial of Access – Natural Disaster)** | **Finance; Operations; Assets, IT and Information** | **2 – Unlikely** | **6** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **28** | **Bomb Threat (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **Operations** | **2 – Unlikely** | **6** | **Moderate** | **4–8 hours** | **Routine monitoring** |
| **29** | **Road Closure (Denial of Access – Man-made Disaster)** | **Operations** | **3 – Possible** | **6** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours** | **Risk acceptance approval** |
| **30** | **Telecommunications Failure (Equipment and IT-Related Disruption)** | **Operations** | **2 – Unlikely** | **6** | **Moderate** | **1–4 hours** | **Risk acceptance approval** |
| **31** | **Industrial Action (Unavailability of People)** | **Operations** | **1 – Rare** | **4** | **Very Low / Low** | **1–2 weeks** | **Risk acceptance approval** |

## Management Validation

These scores are indicative. SAESL should validate them before using them for investment decisions, through the steps below.

1. **Threat owner review:** each owner confirms the threat description, likelihood drivers and existing controls.
2. **CBF owner review:** owners of the 25 critical business functions confirm the operational impact and the expected disruption period.
3. **Specialist validation:** IT, security, facilities, human resources and procurement specialists confirm technical and workforce assumptions.
4. **Control effectiveness:** confirm which assumed controls exist, are tested and would work during the event.
5. **Evidence review:** compare scores with incident data, near-miss records and threat intelligence.
6. **Consequence confirmation:** validate financial assumptions and legal and regulatory consequences with finance and legal specialists.
7. **Challenge:** enterprise risk management and business continuity management challenge the scores for consistency.
8. **Approval:** senior management approves the scores through the risk governance process, aligned with risk appetite, and records any disagreements or overrides.
9. **Reassessment:** review scores periodically and after incidents, exercises or major changes to the organisation, its customers or its engines.

## [![New call-to-action](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/b5945536-415f-4c64-9e05-c7b4d4f26c76.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/b5945536-415f-4c64-9e05-c7b4d4f26c76)

## Conclusion

Impact and likelihood scoring turns the Threat Register into prioritised risk information. SAESL can see which threats need action first, how large the consequences could be and how long operations might be disrupted. The highest impact score and the likelihood set the rating, and professional judgement should shape how that rating is used.

High risks should drive mitigation and continuity investment, and every score should be reviewed as threats, controls and conditions change. An effective risk assessment shows not only which threats may occur, but also the scale of their consequences, their credible likelihood and the period for which they could disrupt the essential services of Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited.

**Continue reading:** Chapter 6, *Mitigation Strategies for Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited*, turns the scored risks into mitigation strategies, each with a justification and a target residual rating.

| Building Resilient Operations: Implementing Business Continuity Management at SAESL |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **eBook 3: Starting Your BCM Implementation** |  |  |
| **C1** | **C2** | **C3** |
| [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[BIA\] MBCO Corporate MBCO](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/f4f03ddd-eaeb-4bb4-b54e-13ab983d01f0.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/f4f03ddd-eaeb-4bb4-b54e-13ab983d01f0) | [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[BIA\] \[PS\] Key Product and Services](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/325e8bd0-70bd-4ca9-ab66-f0bd34d92159.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/325e8bd0-70bd-4ca9-ab66-f0bd34d92159) | [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[RAR\] \[T1\] List of Threats](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/34c25b01-092e-4a67-b1b7-eca00ba7bff9.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/34c25b01-092e-4a67-b1b7-eca00ba7bff9) |
| **C4** | **C5** | **C6** |
| [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[RAR\] \[T2\] Treatment and Control](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/4c3bc7e2-f2f9-4310-b4ad-9e1a41c0781f.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/4c3bc7e2-f2f9-4310-b4ad-9e1a41c0781f) | [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[RAR\] \[T3\] Risk Impact and Likelihood Assessment](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/41325e62-64cc-48b2-b881-368540aec8e1.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/41325e62-64cc-48b2-b881-368540aec8e1) | [![\[BCM\] \[SAESL\] \[E3\] \[BCS\] \[T1\] Mitigation Strategies and Justification](https://no-cache.hubspot.com/cta/default/3893111/ce8f26ea-fdfa-48db-b70b-0e537930628c.png)](https://cta-redirect.hubspot.com/cta/redirect/3893111/ce8f26ea-fdfa-48db-b70b-0e537930628c) |
|  |  |  |

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